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Pictorial Resemblance
The theories holding that pictures depict in virtue
of resembling their subject matter are the oldest
of the general kinds of approaches to explain-
ing depiction. Plato gave an example of such a
theory in his dialogue, Cratylus, and C. S. Peirce
also endorsed a theory of this kind.1 Such theo-
ries have recently been revived and given a more
sophisticated presentation. JohnHyman and John
V. Kulvicki both make this claim in their (other-
wise very different) theories of depiction, and a
range of other philosophers have supported, and
continue to argue for, theories of this kind.2
This article develops a new account of the role
of resemblance in depiction that is critical of such
theories. Of course, I am not the first to aim criti-
cism in this direction.NelsonGoodman is themost
famous critic of resemblance theories. In a series
of arguments inLanguages of Art, he showed that
no resemblance can be sufficient for depiction.3
This point is now generally accepted, but as many
have sincepointedout, it does not in itself disprove
resemblance theories. Rather, it could equally in-
dicate that other conditions, together with resem-
blance, are sufficient for picturehood.4 A more
effective way of disproving resemblance theories
would be to argue that resemblance is not nec-
essary for depiction. This approach, which Good-
man and others have largely ignored, is the strat-
egy I take.5
My approach is also unusual in another way,
for while I argue that pictures do not necessar-
ily resemble their subject matter, I do not reject
the importance of resemblance in depiction. Most
pictures, I allow, do resemble their subject matter
in specifiable respects, and this fact does play an
important, although not necessary, role in estab-
lishing depiction.
I begin by clarifying the notion of resemblance
and discussing John Hyman’s account of the ways
in which pictures resemble their subject matter.
Hyman’s account is the most extensive and care-
fully considered of those currently available and
is a useful foil for my own account. The arti-
cle is then devoted to two general arguments
that support my position. First, I argue that pic-
tures usually do resemble their subject matter,
but that these resemblances are often different
from those proposed by Hyman. By identifying
and analyzing ways in which pictures do resem-
ble their subject matter, I show that the character
of pictorial resemblance depends on the consti-
tution of our visual recognitional abilities. Since
the particular constitution of these abilities is an
empirical matter, these resemblances cannot be
regarded as necessary for depiction. Second, I ar-
gue that there also exist instances of depiction
that do not depend on any resemblance. These
instances of depiction without resemblance are
exceptions to the pictorial resemblances I iden-
tify, and they show that resemblance of any kind
is not necessary for depiction. These too find
their explanation in facts about our visual recogni-
tional abilities. I conclude by discussing the posi-
tive consequences of my arguments for theories of
depiction.
i. kinds of resemblance
I will call all theories that hold that a viewer-
independent resemblance between a picture and
its referent is necessary for depiction resemblance
theories. I will say what I mean by ‘viewer-
independent resemblance’ in a moment; first
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though, I should note that this definition of a re-
semblance theory is broader than is traditionally
made, for it encompasses a range of sophisticated,
post-Goodman, theories, including Hyman’s and
Kulvicki’s, that see other conditions as also neces-
sary for depiction. Hyman, for instance, holds that
it is necessary that pictures resemble their subject
matter in certain respects, but also sees experience
as having a crucial role.6
It is important to specify that our interest here
is in viewer-independent resemblances. These are
resemblances that involve a sharing of viewer-
independent properties. Such properties may be
an object’s intrinsic properties, such as its geomet-
rical shape, or they may be properties that are not
intrinsic to the object, but are nevertheless viewer
independent. Occlusion shape, which I discuss be-
low, is one such property. The shape an object oc-
cludes is not an intrinsic property, for it depends on
how it is positioned relative to a particular view-
point X. But neither is it viewer-dependent, for it
can be specified without reference to a particular
viewer (it is the solid angle the object subtends at
X).
The concept of viewer-independent resem-
blance corresponds at least roughly with our ev-
eryday notion of resemblance. Viewer-dependent
resemblance, by contrast, does not. A viewer-
dependent resemblance involves the sharing of
viewer-dependent properties. These properties
are abilities to generate the same or a simi-
lar response in the viewer. Viewer-dependent
properties may often be explained by the
presence of viewer-independent properties, but
they are not necessarily accompanied by such
properties. Viewer-dependent resemblance is
therefore no guarantee of viewer-independent
resemblance.7
When resemblance theorists speak of resem-
blance, it is viewer-independent resemblance that
they mean; and when I speak of resemblance be-
low, that is also what I mean. I should also add a
word about color here, for there is dispute over
whether it is a viewer-independent or viewer-
dependent property. Resemblance theorists
usually speak of color properties as viewer inde-
pendent (Hyman has developed this positionmost
explicitly).8 I will begin by giving resemblance the-
orists the benefit of the doubt on this point, but
the issue of the subjectivity of some kinds of colors
will arise later in this article.
ii. occlusion shape and aperture color
Hyman proposes that pictures resemble their sub-
ject matter with respect to occlusion shape and
aperture color.9 Let me treat occlusion shape first.
Pictures use configurations of two-dimensional
shapes (usually delimited by lines or variations in
tone or color) to depict three-dimensional forms.
For a resemblance theorist, this poses a ques-
tion: what is the salient resemblance between
the two-dimensional shapes on the picture’s sur-
face and the three-dimensional forms they de-
pict? We might simply say, “shape,” but this re-
sponse only elides the differences between the
two-dimensional shapes on the picture’s surface
and the depicted forms; it identifies no common,
shared property. Responding to this problem, Hy-
man proposes that pictures resemble their subject
matter with respect to occlusion shape.
An object’s occlusion shape is the solid angle
that the object subtends at the point occupied by
the viewer’s eye.10 An easy way to grasp what oc-
clusion shape is to take a pane of glass and place
it between oneself and the object. One then looks
through the glass at the object and traces the ob-
ject’s outline on the glass. The resultant outline,
from that point of view, will have the same oc-
clusion shape as the traced object. If this outlined
shape were to be filled in with an opaque mate-
rial such as paint, provided one’s point of view had
notmoved, it would precisely occlude the outlined
object.11 Hyman proposes that for a picture to de-
pict an object, X, it is necessary that the particular
part of the surface that depicts the object has the
same occlusion shape as X. Hyman calls this the
‘occlusion shape principle.’
Now to Hyman’s account of color resem-
blance.12 Many (although of course not all) pic-
tures employ color to convey part of their depic-
tive content. Red is typically used to depict a fire
engine’s hue, white to depict the brightness of the
moon, and so on. I call those pictures that use
color to convey depictive content ‘color pictures.’
Note that I include tone or brightness as a color
property, as well as hue and saturation.
Hyman’s reasons for introducing the notion of
aperture color are similar to those that prompthim
to introduce occlusion shape. He begins by con-
sidering some problems encountered in trying to
formulate simple accounts of color resemblance.
Perhaps the simplest interpretation we can give
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resemblance theories as they apply to color will
hold that picture and subject matter share local or
surface color. Visually indiscriminable samples of
color have the same local color—samples of paint
out of the same pot, for instance, will share local
color. This interpretation cannot be right formany
color pictures, however. Many color pictures de-
viate from simply reproducing the local colors of
their subject matter in order to depict changes in
shadowing and illumination over a surface, reflec-
tive surfaces, textured surfaces, aerial perspective,
and other factors that can change our perception
of an object’s local color. Pictures that depict shad-
owing and illumination, for instance, will typically
use a darker color than the subject matter’s local
color to depict the shaded part of the surface and
will use a brighter color than the local color to
depict the illuminated portion of the surface.
In response to such concerns, Hyman proposes
that while some simple color pictures do share lo-
cal colors with their subject matter, others must
share other kinds of color properties—properties
that are not intrinsic but still viewer indepen-
dent.13 In particular, he thinks, “when shading is
used, the aperture colors of the various parts of
a painting’s surface are the same as the aperture
colors of the various surface colors they depict,
as long as the painting is suitably lit.”14 Aperture
color is the color that a part of a surface appears
to have when it is viewed in isolation, through an
aperture such as a small hole in a piece of gray
card. Viewing colors in this way cuts out environ-
mental influences, such as contrast and constancy
effects, that ordinarily affect our perception of
color.
Occlusion shape and aperture color are not in-
trinsic properties of things, but they are viewer-
independent properties. As one moves about an
object, its occlusion shape and aperture colors
will change, but note that both can be determined
without reference to a viewer. To do this, one only
needs to specify a particular geometrical point,
coinciding with the point from which the object is
viewed. As I have said, this point, in conjunction
with intrinsic facts about the shape of the object,
will be enough to determine occlusion shape. If we
know facts about the object’s textural and reflec-
tive properties, how it is illuminated, and other
features affecting the transmission of light from
the object to the point of view, we can also de-
termine the object’s aperture colors. In short, the
object’s aperture colors are the colors that the rays
of light reflected from the object have where they
intersect the point of view.
Certainly, aspects of shape and color play an
important role in depiction. But why should it be
occlusion shape and aperture color?Hyman’s idea
is that two objects with the same occlusion shapes
and aperture colors will cause the eye to receive
the same stimulus, so explaining the similarity of
our response. Since light travels in straight lines,
the lines projected from an object to the pupil of
a viewer will correspond to rays of light reflecting
from the object and projecting into the viewer’s
eye. Similarly, the lines projected from the pic-
ture to the pupil will correspond to rays of light
reflecting from the two-dimensional figure to the
viewer’s eye. In either case the light rays reflecting
from the solid body or the picture will deliver the
same pattern of light to the eye. The stimulation
is thus the same, whether caused by the presence
of the solid body or the picture.
iii. resemblance and recognition
It may seem that there are straightforward coun-
terexamples to the occlusion shape principle.
While it will apply to perspective pictures and
ordinary photographs that preserve occlusion
shapes, it may appear that other pictures do not
preserve the occlusion shapes of their subjectmat-
ter. Prior to the invention of perspective in Eu-
rope, and atmost times in cultures outsideEurope,
occlusion shapes have not been preserved in pic-
tures. But Hyman has a reply to this. He makes a
distinction between a picture’s “internal” and “ex-
ternal” subjectmatter. The internal subjectmatter
is that which the picture occasions an experience
of, and the external subjectmatter is the actual ob-
ject from which the picture was painted. Hyman
intends his claims about resemblance to apply to a
picture’s internal subject matter. They might also
apply to the external subject matter, but only inso-
far as the picture represents that external subject
matter faithfully. So it will not concern him that
the occlusion shapes and aperture colors of a pic-
ture do not correspond to any real thing. Rather,
he claims, they correspond to the occlusion shapes
and colors of the items that the picture occasions
an experience of.15
An awkward conclusion follows from this re-
ply, for it implies that a nonperspectival picture
will occasion an experience of its subject matter
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Newall fig. 1. Line drawings after (from left to right) Still-Life with Eggs and Game (detail), from the House of Julia
Felix, Pompeii, first century a.d., Museo Nazionale, Naples; Still Life with Water-Fowl and Flask of Water (detail), from
Herculaneum, first century a.d., Naples Archaeological Museum; Bowls of Fruit and Amphora (detail), from the House of
Julia Felix, Pompeii, first century a.d., Museo Nazionale, Naples.
as having the spatial properties associatedwith the
occlusion shapes used to depict it, rather than hav-
ing the spatial properties associated with its actual
occlusion shape. That is, it will occasion an expe-
rience of a distorted version of its subject matter.
This might be an acceptable conclusion in the case
of intentional pictorial misrepresentation, such as
caricature.16 But where misrepresentation is not
intended it is less plausible, for it implies that every
such picture produced without the benefits of per-
spective techniques will occasion experiences that
differ from those intended by the picture maker.
On this account, every picture made before the
invention of perspective is in various respects a
failure, for the experiences of seeing that they oc-
casion fail to match the intentions of the picture
makers.
I make two responses to this. First, pictorial
experience can be noncommittal with respect to
certain kinds of properties. One kind of spatial
property to which this is an attractive response
is detail. When, say, an impressionist painter es-
chews the intricate occlusion shapes that would
depict a van Eyck-like level of detail, it does not
mean that he occasions an experience of his sub-
ject matter as lacking detail. A viewer habituated
to this way of picture making will have an expe-
rience of the subject matter that is noncommittal
about detail at that level (much as we veridically
have such experiences when our vision is blurry,
in conditions of low illumination, and so on). A
viewer unfamiliar with impressionism might ex-
perience the subject matter’s surface as lacking
detail, but that only serves to remind us that most
pictures can support experiences that vary from
that intended by the picture maker.
I will spend more time on the second response,
for it illuminates some underlying issues about
pictorial resemblance. It points out that a form’s
occlusion shape is not the only two-dimensional
shape that can occasion experiences of that form:
other kinds of resemblances can be used for this
purpose. I shall focus on one example, the depic-
tion inGreco-Romanpaintingof tilted circles. Per-
spective stipulates that tilted circles are depicted
using ellipses (since a circle viewed from an an-
gle occludes an elliptical shape). Greco-Roman
painting typically uses another shape for this pur-
pose, one I call a ‘pointed ellipse.’ This can be seen
in the line drawings in Newall fig. 1, drawn after
details of Roman still-life paintings from Pompeii
andHerculaneum. Pointed ellipses are used to de-
pict the dish of eggs in the first picture, the flask
in the second picture, and the bowl’s rim in the
third picture.17 Even taking into account the loose
brushwork of some of these painters, it is clear
that none of these rims is depicted using an ellipse.
Rather, they use a pointed ellipse—an upper and
a lower curve that meet in pointed vertices. Usu-
ally these vertices are slightly rounded, and the
upper curve projects further from the horizontal
axis than does the lower curve.
Now, it is true that we can see these pictures as
depicting distorted rims. Indeed, coming to these
pictures for the first time, it may be hard not to see
them this way—the vessels themselves can seem to
have a pointed elliptical cross section rather than
a circular one. But I think we have to acknowl-
edge that the ancient Greeks and Romans did
not see them this way. How can we know this?
The Greco-Roman tradition of pictorial realism,
by which I mean the pursuit of a lifelike effect, is a
long and continuous one. Its major advances had
mostly been established in Greece by the fourth
century b.c., about four hundred years before the
examples I am discussing were produced. Much
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as in European painting from the Renaissance
to the nineteenth century, lifelike effects, even
to the extent of illusion, were highly prized by
artists and audiences alike.18 But seeing the rims
in these pictures as distorted detracts from these
pictures’ lifelike effects. It is reasonable to think
that if ancient viewers perceived these pictures in
this way, they would have decisively redressed the
deficiency of the pointed ellipse schema at some
point. TheGreeks andRomanswould hardly have
put up with such a prevalent (and readily fixed or
hidden) flaw in pictures that aimed at realism—
and so, I think we must acknowledge that this was
no flaw at all. That is, ancient audiences were able
to see circular rims in such pictures without the
occlusion shapes of those rims being preserved in
the marks on the picture surface.
Another factor thatmakesme think this conclu-
sion is right is that in working with these images, I
have found that the senseof distortiondoes indeed
wane and disappear after studying them for some
time. This accords with other anecdotal reports of
introduction to novel systems of depiction. In par-
ticular, those unused to perspective pictures can
report an analogous effect, until they become ha-
bituated to them.Gombrich’s quotation of Yoshio
Markino, a London-based Japanese artist writing
early last century, makes this point well.
When I got a book of the drawing lessons atmy grammar
school there was a drawing of a square box in the correct
perspective. My father saw it and said, “What? This box
is surely not square, it seems to me very much crooked.”
About nine years later he was looking at the same book
and he called me and said, “How strange it is! You know
I used to think this square box looked crooked, but now
I see this is perfectly right.”19
The point I draw here is that having the correct
experience in front of a picture does not necessar-
ily happen automatically if it is in an unfamiliar
style. Note that this position does not entail con-
ventionalism. It shows only that we sometimes
require habituation to new systems of depiction
before we can fully understand them. There still
exist constraints on the configuration of marks
that can occasion a particular experience. These
constraints are not as restrictive as those stipu-
lated by the occlusion shape principle, but they
still exist. There are, for instance, many shapes
that surely cannot be used to depict a circular rim
(rectangles, triangles, and so on).
What then are these constraints, and why is de-
piction so constrained? To answer these questions,
we shall need to consider recognitional mech-
anisms that mediate visual perception—in this
case, it is the mechanisms governing the recog-
nition of volumetric form. I shall make use of
Irving Biederman’s theory of volumetric form
perception.20
In the interests of speed of processing, visual
recognition is based not on the entire array of
light entering the eye, but on salient features of
that array. In the case of the perception of vol-
umetric form, recognition is based primarily on
certain features of the edge information encoded
by an early stage for processing called the primal
sketch. Not all features of this edge information
are made use of in recognition, only those that
are “non-accidental”: those that, over a variety of
viewpoints, tend to be reliable (although not infal-
lible) indexes of real spatial relations. It is combi-
nations of these that form the grounds for recog-
nition of simple three-dimensional forms such as
cylinders, blocks, wedges, and spheres.
The case that concerns us is that of the cylin-
der (including variant forms with a circular cross
section, such as a dish or bowl shape). Biederman
proposes that the visible circular “top” of a cylin-
der is indicated in the primal sketch by a figure,
symmetrical around twoaxes, comprisedof curved
edges coterminating in Y vertices on the long
axis.21 An ellipse, of course, satisfies these con-
straints, as one would expect. But what is of inter-
est here is that other shapes—in particular pointed
ellipses—also do so. The particular curvature that
distinguishes a true ellipse from a pointed ellipse
is not taken into consideration on Biederman’s
account. Indeed, he stresses that the recognition
process cannot “be dependent on absolute judge-
ments of quantitative detail,” as such judgments
would be slow and unreliable.22 “For example, dis-
tinguishing among just several levels of the de-
gree of curvature . . . typically requires more than
that required for the identification of the object
itself.”23
If Beiderman’s account is right, it would give us
an explanation of why Greco-Roman still lifes do
successfully depict the rims of bowls, dishes, and
other vessels as circular. For while the pointed
ellipse and true ellipse produce different pat-
terns of light on the retina, and so generate cor-
respondingly different primal sketch representa-
tions, the ensuing process in which recognition of
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volumetric form occurs is not sensitive to these
differences and so recognizes both as tilted
circles.24
This analysis in terms of recognitional abilities
implies that, while occlusion shape need not be
preserved, particular features of occlusion shape
will be preserved. In our example, to depict a rim
as a tilted circle, a picture must preserve the fol-
lowing properties of the rim’s occlusion shape: the
properties of being a figure comprised of an up-
per and lower curve, each curving out from, and
roughly symmetrical around, an axis. As will now
be clear, these properties may be instantiated by
a pointed ellipse, as in the Greco-Roman pictures
I have discussed, just as well as the true ellipse
stipulated by perspective.
I have argued that the occlusion principle does
not hold in all cases. But assuming Biederman’s
theory is correct, we have in this case identified an-
other,more generic viewer-independent respect of
resemblance: the features of occlusion shape that
are salient to recognition of a tilted circle. Further
analysis could be made in the same vein, using
Biederman’s theory to identify a range of resem-
blances between pictures and other forms. Could
these new resemblances be used to support a re-
semblance theory? They cannot. One reason why
they cannot is that such resemblances will only be
recognitionally relevant because our visual sys-
tem is sensitive to resemblances in those respects.
If our recognitional abilities were sensitive to dif-
ferent features, then picture makers would need
to preserve different features in order to depict
their subject matter. We can certainly imagine a
visual system (and perhaps Hyman does imagine
such a system) in which recognition is responsive
to all features of occlusion shape, so that pictures
must reproduce an object’s occlusion shape pre-
cisely if they are to successfully depict that ob-
ject.25 Thus, if resemblances with respect to shape
can be found, they will not be necessary for de-
piction; rather, their role in depiction will be de-
termined by the constitution of the human visual
system.
A similar argument can be made about color. I
will not go into depth about this here, as I have
made such an argument in detailed form else-
where.26 The salient points can be briefly stated.
Most painters usually make no attempt to repro-
duce the aperture colors of their subject matter.
Indeed, this task is often impossible anyway, since
the brightest colors observable in nature will be
much brighter than those that a painting, viewed
under normal gallery lighting, can reproduce.27 So,
instead of reproducing the absolute lightnesses
and darknesses of a scene, a painter will aim to
preserve in the picture the relations of lightness
and darkness. A white pigment need not be any-
where near as bright as, say, a glowing streetlight
in order to depict it; it need only be brighter than
its surrounding pigments. To take another case,
a painter need not reproduce the precise hue of
something in order to faithfully depict it. Rather,
shemay use a hue that a viewermay still recognize
as being somewhat of the subject matter’s hue. So,
a blue car can be depicted using a range of bluish
hues, andnot just those of the car’s aperture colors.
Here it is a relation of similarity that is preserved.
These are instances in which aperture colors are
not preserved, but features of aperture colors—
relative tone and similarity of hue—are. Again,
though, this does not provide a basis for a re-
semblance theory, for these resemblances prove to
be contingent upon the constitution of our recog-
nitional abilities. Our recognitional abilities have
evolved to be sensitive to these properties of aper-
ture color because they are especially salient—and
more so than precise aperture colors—to recogni-
tion. Since conditions of illumination under which
objects can be seen typically vary, an object’s aper-
ture colors can vary in a range of ways. This makes
the precise aperture colors of an object an unreli-
able basis for recognition.
Similarity of hue and relative brightness give a
more useful basis on which visual recognition can
be made, for these properties are preserved un-
der a wide range of conditions. If the brightness of
the illumination under which an object is seen is
reduced, it reduces correspondingly the absolute
brightnesses of that object’s colors but tends to
preserve the relative brightnesses of those colors.
If one color is brighter than another, this relation
will typically be preserved regardless of their light
source’s dimming or brightening. Changing illumi-
nation also has effects on hue, but these are usu-
ally more limited. A blue surface, for instance, will
typically retain at least a bluish appearance under
most variations in illumination. So responding to
similarity of hue is usually a preferable basis for
recognition than responding to a precise hue.28
The color properties that color pictures pre-
serve are thus those that are salient to visual
recognition. But, again, we can readily imagine
a visual system that is sensitive to different color
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properties. If we could perceive ultraviolet light,
as some animals can, our pictures would repro-
duce correspondingly different color properties.
So, again, we find that these resemblances are not
necessary for depiction, for they depend on con-
tingent facts about the human visual system.
iv. depiction without resemblance: depiction
of subjective effects
The other reason why these resemblances do not
support a resemblance theory is that we can also
identify instances of depiction of form that do not
depend on any viewer-independent resemblance.
I will consider two general kinds of example. The
first, which I briefly consider an example of in this
section, involves the depiction of subjective ef-
fects. The second, which I treat more extensively
in the following section, involves the use of sub-
jective effects in depiction.
My first kind of example is drawn from a well-
known art-historical source: the Pointillist paint-
ings and drawings of Georges Seurat. One of Seu-
rat’s aims was to depict the subjective effect of
simultaneous contrast. This is most readily seen
in the “haloes” of contrasting color and tone with
which he silhouettes figures in his paintings and
drawings. Newall fig. 2, a digital rendering after a
Seurat drawing, shows the subtle effect in slightly
exaggerated form. Simultaneous contrast occurs
when areas of differing tone or areas of differing
hue are placed so that their edges touch. In such
cases the perception of each tone or hue, around
the edge where they meet, is heightened. When a
dark tone is placed next to a light tone, the dark
tone appears darker then it otherwise would, and
the light tone appears brighter than it otherwise
would. Similarly, when differing hues are placed
next to one another, they appear more different
in hue than they in fact are. Orange placed next to
gray will make the gray appear bluish, for exam-
ple.29 As I have said, Seurat depicted this effect by
heightening the contrasts of hue and tone around
the edges of the objects he depicts.30
It has on occasion been said that Seurat’s de-
piction of simultaneous contrast stems from amis-
understanding of the phenomenon.31 This line of
thought points out that if two colors are placed
side by side on a canvas, they can be expected to
generate the same effect of simultaneous contrast
they would produce if they appeared in nature.
Thus, to reproduce the effect of simultaneous con-
Newall fig. 2. Digital drawing after Georges Seurat, Seated
Nude: Study forUneBaignade, 1883, conte´ crayon on paper,
National Galleries of Scotland, Edinburgh.
trast between, say, an object and the background
against which it appears, it should suffice to repro-
duce the local colors of the object and the back-
ground, for once these colors are reproduced on
the canvas, their proximity will generate a simul-
taneous contrast identical to that produced by the
subject matter.
Such arguments are not convincing and have
not convinced art historians. John Gage and
Georges Roque have observed that a plausible
rationale does exist for the depiction of simulta-
neous contrast and was available to Seurat and
his contemporaries in Hermann von Helmholtz’s
well-known essay, “The Relation of Optics to
Painting.”32 We have already seen that Helmholtz
pointed out that it is impossible to recreate in a
painting the brightness of many colors that appear
in nature. But since contrast effects are “produced
more strongly by bright light and brilliantly satu-
rated colors than by faint light and duller colors,”
Helmholtz suggests a way of partially overcoming
this:
An artist [who] wishes to reproduce as strikingly as pos-
sible, with the pigments at his command, the impression
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which real objects produce . . . must indicate with paint
the contrasts which the real objects naturally display. . .
If the colors in a painting were as strong and brilliant as
those of actual objects, the contrasts which appear in re-
ality would appear automatically in a painting. Here . . .
subjective visual phenomena must be introduced objec-
tively into a painting, since the colors and light intensities
in it are different from reality.33
The depiction of contrast effects can therefore
compensate for the inability of painting to repro-
duce the bright and saturated colors of a sunlit
scene. Bright and saturated colors generate strong
contrast effects, and while the brightness and sat-
uration of these colors may not be reproducible
in a painting, the hues of their associated contrast
effects can be reproduced.Helmholtz gives a num-
ber of examples that make it clear he includes the
depiction of simultaneous contrast, giving exam-
ples of contrast with respect to both brightness
and hue: “Painters and draftsmen generally make
a plain, uniformly lighted surface brighter where
it meets a dark object and darker where it meets
a light one. You will find that uniformly grey sur-
faces are given a yellowish tint at the edge where
there is a background of blue and a rose-red tint
where there is green.”34 Helmholtz was writing
before Seurat depicted the effects he describes,
and his remarks are a useful reminder that while
Seurat’s paintings are the most prominent exam-
ples of depicting these effects, many artists before
him had more subtly incorporated them into their
pictures. One prominent example that Helmholtz
may have had in mind are those paintings by
Vela´zquez in which his subjects appear against a
blank ground with the dark edges of their bod-
ies clearly “haloed,” such as The Buffoon Sebas-
tian deMorra (c. 1646, Museo Nacional del Prado,
Madrid) and Juan de Pareja (1650, Metropolitan
Museum of Art, New York).
Now, considering Seurat’s, and others’, use of
painted-in haloes to depict simultaneous contrast,
we may challenge the resemblance theorist to
find a resemblance between picture and refer-
ent on which this depiction depends. Clearly, we
will find nothing corresponding to aperture col-
ors of the painted-in halo in the referent’s aper-
ture colors, for in the latter case it is a sub-
jective, viewer-dependent effect. Indeed, for the
same reason there can be no viewer-independent
resemblance whatsoever between the painted-in
halo and the referent. Nor can there be a re-
Newall fig. 3.
semblance between the painted halo that depicts
this effect and the features in life that give rise
to it, for in life the perceived halo is a response
of our visual system to the intense illumination
and saturated colors that, as we have seen, paint-
ing is unable to reproduce. In short, there is no
resemblance on which this instance of depiction
depends.
v. depiction without resemblance: use of
subjective effects in depiction
This section considers examples in which subjec-
tive effects are used to depict properties of tone,
hue, and shape.35 I begin with an example of the
depiction of tonal properties. Newall fig. 3 depicts
theuppermost part of aDoric column.Thevertical
bands of tone on the shaft that depict its fluting are
each a single, homogenous tone—a fact that can be
readily confirmed by looking at each area of tone
separately through a reduction screen. However,
due to simultaneous contrast of tone, the bands of
tone appear darker on the sides where they abut a
lighter band and lighter where they abut a darker
band. This subjective effect allows the picture to
depict a feature of the column that it otherwise
would not. On account of this effect each sec-
tion of fluting is depicted as having one edge in
shadow and one more brightly illuminated; that is
to say, each section is depicted as being a concave
surface.36
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Newall fig. 4. Akiyoshi Kitaoka, Fish, 2003 (www.ritsumei.ac.jp/∼akitaoka/cafewalle.html).
Again there can be no viewer-independent re-
semblance on which this depends. The concave
facets of an actual column are perceived as such
because they are shaded on one edge and more
brightly illuminated on the other. Here, the si-
multaneous contrast, used to depict the variations
in illumination and thus the concavity, is a sub-
jective effect. Nor can a salient resemblance be
found between concave fluting and the features
of the figure that generate the effect, for while the
former are recognized as concave by distinctive
variations in shade and illumination, the latter are
simply stripes of single, undifferentiated shades.
The next example is a color image and so does
not lend itself to reproduction in the print ver-
sion of this journal. A description will suffice here
(the image itself is included as supporting infor-
mation in the electronic version of this article).37
Consider a picture of red apples against a back-
ground of green foliage. However, rather than us-
ing red pigment or light to depict the apples as red,
the areas depicting the apples are in fact gray or
slightly greenish (which can be confirmed by view-
ing these areas through a reduction screen). The
depiction of the apples as red depends on simul-
taneous contrast of hue: because a bright green is
used to depict the surrounding foliage, the patches
that depict the apples appear to have a distinct red
tinge, an effect that allows the viewer to see red
apples in the picture surface and so allows the pic-
ture to depict the apples as red.
The situation is much the same as the previous
example. The depiction of the apples as red cannot
depend on a viewer-independent resemblance, be-
cause simultaneous contrast is a subjective effect.
Nor can a salient resemblance be found between
the hue of the depicted apples and the hue of the
areas of the picture that depict them, for as we can
see using the reduction screen, these areas are not
in fact red or in any degree reddish.
I now turn to an example of the use of a sub-
jective effect to depict shape. Akiyoshi Kitaoka’s
Fish (Newall fig. 4) depicts an arrangement of
fish as having bodies that taper toward their tails.
However, the shapes used to depict their taper-
ing bodies are in fact rectangles; their sides are all
straight lines, parallel to one another. The impres-
sion that these shapes taper is a strong one, and it
may be necessary to take a ruler to the picture to
demonstrate to oneself that the lines are indeed
parallel.
Kitaoka exploits the cafe´wall illusion, sonamed
because it was first noticed in a tiled cafe´ wall.38
Across narrow areas of intermediate tone, bright
tones “lock,” appearing to extend into the inter-
mediately toned area. R. L. Gregory and Priscilla
Heard suggest that border locking ordinarily func-
tions to ensure that edges are correctly “locked”
together—that is, that the borders of contiguous
regions of contrasting tone (and color) are rec-
ognized as edges. Here it “malfunctions” so that
where the gray lines lie between black and white
areas, the white appears to extend into the gray,
so that the white areas appear to angle out at this
point.39 Our visual system makes sense of this by
seeing the gray lines as tilted at a corresponding
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angle, so giving rise to the perception of the fish’s
bodies as interlocking wedges.
Here we will be unable to identify any viewer-
independent features shared by the occlusion
shapes of the picture and the depicted fish on
which this instance of depiction could depend. It
might be objected that, as with the examples of
Greco-Roman painting I discussed, some salient
common features might yet be identified. But this
is not so. The depicted edges of the fish tilt, but the
lines that depict those edges do not. Could verti-
cality share some feature of orientation with an
angle somewhat off the vertical? It can rightly be
pointed out that these two orientations are more
like one another than vertical is like horizontal, for
instance—so do they not share something? They
do, but what they share is merely extension along
a particular dimension—let us call it y. The verti-
cal line extends across y only, while the tilted line
also extends across a perpendicular dimension, x.
But extension across y is not the critical feature
of Kitaoka’s picture that affects misrecognition of
the lines in the building as tilted. For as we have
seen in the account of the cafe´ wall illusion, it is
the particular configuration of shapes, tones, and
lines that gives rise to the effect.40 There is then
no resemblance on which this instance of depic-
tion could depend.
One could readily construct a wide range of
similar counterexamples using other optical illu-
sions that involve a misperception of shape or
relative size.41 But this example is enough to es-
tablish my conclusion—that there are instances of
depiction of shape that do not depend on viewer-
independent resemblance.
Let me consider a possible objection. It might
be asked whether the flat bands of tone really do
depict the fluting as concave, whether the neu-
trally hued patches really do depict the apples as
red, and whether Kitaoka really does depict his
fish with tapering bodies. In particular, it might be
objected that the interpretation of the fluting as
concave, the apples as red, and the fish as taper-
ing involves a misinterpretation of these pictures.
On this account, the pictures are properly seen as,
and really depict, a column whose shaft is com-
prised of flat planes, not concave flutes; neutrally
hued apples, rather than red apples; and rectan-
gular rather than tapering fish. After all, a real
shaft faced with flat planes will produce the same
subjective effect and could readily be mistaken
for a fluted column. Neutrally hued apples, seen
amid an abundance of bright green foliage, could
be mistaken for riper fruit. If we did happen to
come across a fishmonger selling rectangular fish
arrayed and patterned as they are in Kitaoka’s
picture, we might well mistake them for tapered
fish. Moreover, normative systems of depiction,
such as photography, will not rely on these effects.
They will depict the fluting using light and dark
tones, the red surface of apples using red pigments,
and the strangely patterned fish using rectangular
shapes. A critic might say that it is significant that
a photograph of a column that has flat facets will
feature flat bands of color, as does my picture
of the column; a photograph of neutrally hued
apples amid bright green leaves will feature the
same hues as the image of apples (in the supple-
mentary information); and that a photograph of
the strange fish will feature rectangular shapes, as
does Kitaoka’s picture. If we happen to interpret
such photographs as depicting a fluted column,
red apples, or tapered fish, we would clearly be
mistaken.
To defend my account, it will help here to
draw on Richard Wollheim’s insights about pic-
tures. Wollheim held that when we understand a
picture, we see the picture’s subject in the pic-
ture; hence, his term ‘seeing-in,’ which has become
a widespread shorthand for pictorial experience.
While it is disputed whether the conditions Woll-
heim lays out are, as he claimed, both necessary
and sufficient for an object to depict X—it is widely
accepted that the conditions he gives are sufficient
for an object to depict X. That is, it is widely ac-
cepted that a surface, Y, depicts subject matter, X,
if (i) X can be seen in Y by a standard viewer, and
(ii) Y’s maker intends X to be seen in Y.42 Thus, if
we can see X in a surface and its maker intended
us to see X in that surface, then the surface is a
picture of X. Now, as we have seen, we are quite
capable of having an experience of seeing-in con-
cave fluting, red apples, and tapered fish in figures.
And it will be equally clear that themaker of these
pictures intended viewers to have this experience.
This is the whole point of Kitaoka’s picture, and
I can be even surer that intention exists in the
cases of the pictures of the column and the apples,
since I designed them. It is beside the point that
this is an unusual way of depicting the column’s
fluting, an apple’s color, or a fish’s shape and that
photography and other forms of picture making
would depict these things in a different way, and
even that we can also see-in other features, such
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as flat facets, neutrally hued apples, and rectangu-
lar fish, if we try. If we can reliably see fluting in
bands of flat tone, red in neutrally hued patches,
and wedges in rectangular shapes, that opens the
way for a picture maker to use these effects to
depictive ends.
vi. conclusion
We have found that while pictures often do not
share their occlusion shapes and aperture colors
with their subjectmatter, we can, for themost part,
expect properties of a subject’s occlusion shapes
and aperture colors to be preserved. The par-
ticular properties they share are determined not
wholly by the geometry of vision (which deter-
mines the relevance of occlusion shape and aper-
ture color), but also by the processes of visual
recognition that underlie seeing in the rest of the
visual system. These processes determine which
features of occlusion shape and aperture color are
relevant to recognition and seeing and thus deter-
mine which properties typically need to be pre-
served by a depiction. While I have only touched
upon the relevant recognitional processes, I hope
I have said enough to show that it is the processes
of visual recognition that often hold the key to
resolving questions about the particular nature of
pictorial resemblances.
As I have argued, these particular resemblances
are therefore not necessary for depiction; rather,
they are contingent on characteristics of our visual
systems. If our visual processing happened to be
sensitive to different properties of occlusion shape
and aperture color, then pictorial resemblances
would differ correspondingly. It follows that we
should prefer theories of depiction that, rather
than affirming that pictures depict their subject
matter partly in virtue of sharing certain proper-
ties, hold that these pictures depict partly in virtue
of engaging visual recognitional abilities engaged
by their subject matter.
This conclusion is further supported by the
examples of depiction without resemblance. For
while we have seen that most instances of depic-
tionwill involve resemblance, it is clear from these
examples that not all do. Not only is resemblance
dependent on recognition, but also recognition
may occur in the absence of resemblance. Again
this tells us that resemblance should not play a part
in a definition of depiction; rather it suggests that
recognition instead forms a necessary condition
for depiction.
It might be wondered at this point why it is
that if resemblance theories are false, pictures still
in many respects resemble their subject matter.
The examples of depiction without resemblance
that I have presented are no doubt unusual in-
stances of depiction—usually picture makers use a
red hue to depict a red subject, darker tones to de-
pict darker areas, lighter tones to depict illumina-
tion, and so on. An answer can be found when we
consider our recognitional abilities as a product of
evolution. One of the general, evolutionarily ad-
vantageous purposes these abilities have evolved
to meet is the recognition of viewer-independent
resemblances in our environment. It can obviously
be useful to be able to recognize objects as having
certain familiar properties or being of some famil-
iar kind. It is for this reason that our visual systems
are so responsive to viewer-independent resem-
blances. However, because our recognitional abil-
ities are fallible—that is to say, because misrecog-
nition can occur—we should not be surprised that
they can sometimes be engaged by objects with-
out these resemblances. Thus we can appreciate
why, despite the fact that pictures do not neces-
sarily resemble their subject matter, fashioning
viewer-independent resemblances is still a rela-
tively straightforward, effective, and thus popular
strategy for making pictures.43
MICHAEL NEWALL
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